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TARGETS MISSED AND TARGETS HIT:
CRITICAL TAX STUDIES AND EFFECTIVE
TAX REFORM
STEVE R. JOHNSON*
Medieval alchemy is popularly associated with attempts to
become rich by transmuting base elements into gold. Such attempts
were less than universally successful. Yet, alchemy yielded great
benefits in other areas. For instance, alchemy was one of the sources
of modem sciences such as pharmacology and metallurgy.' Also, the
rich and profound symbology of alchemy has influenced modem
psychology.'
Something similar may be said of critical tax studies. Such
studies have argued that the Internal Revenue Code as a whole, or
significant features of it, disadvantage-intentionally or
unintentionally-groups historically oppressed or ignored by
American society. Some of these arguments have had force, but
many, I believe, have failed to present a persuasive case. However,
that does not mean that even those efforts have been wasted. Like
alchemy, those efforts have been worthwhile because they have hit
unintended but still important targets.
To be fully persuasive, an argument that the Code discriminates
against, or systematically disadvantages, particular groups should
establish all of four elements:
(1) There is some particular Code feature that operates to the
substantial disadvantage of some group. Typically, this would involve
showing that, as a result of the Code feature, group members pay
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
B.A., St. Francis College; J.D., New York University. I thank Kevin Brown, Stephen
Conrad, Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Monica Howland, and William Popkin for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I also thank Kevin Hyland and Rachel
Soszynski for their research assistance.
1. See CHERRY GILCHRIST, ALCHEMY: THE GREAT WORK 126 (1984). Specific
contributions of alchemy to science include the production of potassium lye and tin
monoxide, the discovery of sodium sulphate and benzoic acid, and the recognition of
many gases. See id. At 127. Also, the works of Isaac Newton and Robert Boyle were
significantly influenced by alchemical procedures and theories. See id. at 127-29.
2. See, e.g., C.G. JUNG, MEMORIES, DREAMS, REFLECrIONS 202-13 (Aniela Jaff6
ed., Richard Winston & Clara Winston trans., Pantheon rev. ed. 1973) (1961).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
proportionately more tax than non-members.
(2) The offending Code feature is not compensated for by other
aspects of the Code that disproportionately benefit the group in
question. That is, there must be an on-balance or on-net evaluation,
a showing that the unfavorable Code aspects hurt group members
more than the favorable Code aspects help them.
(3) The appropriate way to redress the problem would be
changing the Code, rather than changing non-tax rules or practices.
(4) A reasonable solution exists. That is, a way exists to reform
the offending Code section, and that way is technically feasible,
efficacious, and unlikely to create other serious problems.
More often than not, critical tax commentators have failed to
satisfy one or another (sometimes several) of these elements. In the
space available, I can defend this assertion only illustratively, not
comprehensively. Part I discusses critical sexual-orientation studies,
emphasizing the first and second elements above. Part II discusses
critical race studies as to home ownership. Although the second
element is implicated here as well, the principal focus of Part II is on
the third and fourth elements. Finally, Part III explains why, these
failures notwithstanding, these and other critical efforts are
beneficial. Specifically, the perspectives they develop can profitably
inform tax reform initiatives, providing additional intellectual and
political support for worthwhile change.
I. CRITICAL SEXUAL-ORIENTATION STUDIES
Although the bulk of critical tax scholarship involves gender or
race, sexual orientation also has received attention.5 One argument
that has been advanced by advocates of gay and lesbian marriage is
that same-sex couples should be able to receive tax benefits that
married different-sex couples receive. This point was aired during
3. If there is a superior non-Code solution, a useful critical case may well have been
made, but it is not a critical tax case. At most, the interaction of the Code with the non-
tax rule would strengthen the need for reform of that non-tax rule.
4. I omit gender studies because that already has been the most discussed area of
critical tax work and because I intend to treat the area in detail in a future article.
5. In addition, writings of broader scope may have particular significance in the
sexual-orientation context. See, e.g., Joan B. Ellsworth, Prescribing TUMS: An
Alternative to the Marital Deduction for Unmarried Cohabitants, 11 VA. TAX REV. 137
(1991). Professor Ellsworth proposes that the tax law recognize a new device: the so-
called Trust for an Unmarried Survivor. See id. at 138. The purpose of this device would
be to approximate for nontraditional, nonmarital families the estate tax benefit available
to married persons as a result of the marital deduction. See id. Her piece does not
emphasize same-sex couples, but it clearly would have tax implications for them.
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Congress's consideration of the (ill-advised) Defense of Marriage
Act,6 and echoes of it have been audible in the Hawaii same-sex
marriage litigation.7
In the scholarly literature, two significant articles are by Patricia
A. Cain' and Adam Chase.9 Cain, while interested in more general
reform of the Code as it relates to gay and lesbian families, proposes
changes in two specific areas: (1) income tax treatment of the
household income of such families under the joint-return and
assignment-of-income rules, and (2) gift tax treatment of wealth
transfers within such families.'" Chase focuses on how gay and
lesbian couples, through contracting and tax planning, can achieve
parallel rights and benefits to those of married couples."
Neither Cain nor Chase explicitly states whether, in her or his
view, same-sex couples as a whole pay more or less in federal income
tax than comparable married couples. However, both seem to imply
that same-sex couples, on balance, do worse. I argue below that both
the failure to explicitly address the question and the implied answer
given are problematic.
A. Necessity of the Comparative Evaluation
In one respect, I understand Cain's and Chase's decision not to
expressly offer an on-balance conclusion as to whether same-sex
couples pay more or less federal tax than comparable married
couples. At least in part, these authors seem to appeal to the classical
6. Pub. L. No. 104-199, see. 2, § 1738C, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (to be codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1738C); id sec. 3, § 7, 110 Stat. at 2419-2420 (to be codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7);
Defense of Marriage Act: Hearings on H.R. 3396 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 171 (1996) (statement of Professor
Lynn D. Wardle); 142 CONG. REC. S10,079 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996) (letter from Herma
Hill Kay); 142 CONG. RnC. E1299-04 (daily ed. July 17, 1996) (remarks of Rep.
Waxman).
7. In describing "a number of the most salient marital rights and benefits," the
Supreme Court of Hawaii listed first "a variety of state income tax advantages, including
deductions, credits, rates, exemptions, and estimates." Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59
(Haw.), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993). These advantages are
like those under federal tax law because the Hawaiian income tax law adopts the Internal
Revenue Code with some modifications. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 235-2.3, -2.5 (1993 &
Supp. 1995).
8. See Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAW &
SEXUALITY 97 (1991).
9. See Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 72 DENv. U. L. REv. 359
(1995).
10. See Cain, supra note 8, at 101-02.
11. See Chase, supra note 9.
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liberal value of equality.12 From that perspective, it arguably does
not matter which group is treated better now-they should be treated
the same. 3
However, I think that is a less than complete answer. Assume
for argument's sake that same-sex couples actually pay less now in
total tax than comparable married couples. That fact would call into
question both general and specific efforts for reform.
Under this assumption, the general reform of treating committed
same-sex couples the same as married couples for all Code purposes
would be financially harmful to the group Cain and Chase wish to
benefit. For reasons of fairness and dignity, some members of the
group might be willing to accept this bargain. Others, however,
might feel: "Don't do me any such favors."
The matter stands even worse as to specific reforms, whether
statutory, as advocated by Cain, or self-help, as described by Chase.
If, as assumed for the purpose of argument, the tax system already
treats same-sex couples better than married couples, further
particular reforms tax-beneficial to same-sex couples-without other
compensatory changes adverse to them-would exacerbate existing
inequality. Indeed, under our assumption, the question for those
interested in equality would be how to reform the Code detrimentally
to same-sex couples (in terms of how much tax they pay compared to
married couples), not how to reform it beneficially to them.
In short, we cannot escape asking the comparative question.
When considering tax law changes to benefit same-sex couples, we
need to ascertain, as a background matter, whether such couples now
pay more or less in tax than married couples do.
B. The Comparative Evaluation
Cain and Chase do not completely shy away from the
comparative assessment. While they do not say so unequivocally,
both seem to imply that, in their view, same-sex couples bear a
12. See Cain, supra note 8, at 130 ("In an ideal world the tax law would not
discriminate against same-sex couples who are similarly situated to married couples.");
Chase, supra note 9, at 401 ("Although legalizing same-sex marriages would effectively
remove many of the discriminatory legal barriers [including tax barriers] faced by lesbian
women and gay men, it would not remove discrimination altogether.").
13. At the level of principle, I am much in sympathy with this. I agree that there is no
sound reason why the Code should treat people differently because of their sexual
orientation. As a corollary, I agree that, assuming satisfactory indicia of commitment can
be developed, the Code should not treat committed same-sex couples differently from
married couples.
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disproportionately large tax burden,'4 and both catalog various tax
benefits available only to married taxpayers.' 5 Pooling Cain's and
Chase's lists, these benefits are said to include:
(1) The right to file joint returns under I.R.C. § 6013 and the
sometimes preferential rates for married taxpayers under § 1;16
(2) Beneficial adjustments for gift taxes paid by a decedent
spouse under I.R.C. § 2001(d) and gift-splitting under § 2513;
(3) Inter-spousal wealth transfers free of income, estate, and gift
taxes under I.R.C. §§ 1041(a)(1), 2056, and 2523;18
(4) Special estate tax treatment of jointly owned property under
I.R.C. § 2040(b); 9
(5) Exclusion from income of certain benefits furnished by
employers to employees and their spouses and dependents under
I.R.C. §§ 105(b) and 106;2 and
(6) Non-recognition of gain on property transfers incident to
divorce under I.R.C. § 1041(a)(2) and some flexibility as to post-
divorce support payments under I.R.C. §§ 71 and 215.21
However, these contentions are undercut by the failure to
establish the first and second elements of the perguasive case
described above. At least some of the Code features noted by Cain
14. Chase makes the general (non-tax) statement that "[t]he government ... treats
married couples more favorably than it does same-sex couples," Chase, supra note 9, at
361, which he immediately follows with examples of allegedly discriminatory tax
provisions, see id. at 361-62.
Cain properly takes to task advocates of lesbian and gay marriages for
"overlook[ing] the fact that the federal tax laws do not always bestow benefits on married
couples," Cain, supra note 8, at 98, and she notes a number of tax provisions that
penalize, not benefit, such couples, see id. at 98-99. But she immediately follows this by
saying, "Nonetheless, married couples do receive considerable tax benefits," id. at 99,
and she makes other comments that point in the same direction, see, e.g., id. at 129
("[L]esbian and gay couples, who are prevented by state law from marrying, are harmed
by tax laws that limit tax benefits to married couples.").
15. See Cain, supra note 8, at 99; Chase, supra note 9, at 361-62.
16. See Cain, supra note 8, at 99; Chase, supra note 9, at 361.
17. See Cain, supra note 8, at 123-29; Chase, supra note 9, at 362.
18. See Cain, supra note 8, at 99; Chase, supra note 9, at 362.
19. See Cain, supra note 8, at 123-29; Chase, supra note 9, at 361.
20. See Cain, supra note 8, at 99; Chase, supra note 9, at 363-64; Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1
(1956); cf. I.R.C. § 213(a) (West Supp. 1998) (allowing a deduction for certain medical
expenses of the taxpayer, spouse, and dependents). Based on the Defense of Marriage
Act, the IRS has ruled that the § 106 exclusion is not available with respect to employer-
provided coverage of domestic partners because domestic partners are not spouses. See
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-17-018 (Jan. 22, 1997).
21. See Cain, supra note 8, at 99, 115; Chase, supra note 9, at 367. In a related vein,
I.R.C. § 152(e) gives divorced parents some flexibility as to which of them may claim
dependency exemptions for their children. See I.R.C. § 152(e) (West Supp. 1998).
17751998]
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and Chase may not substantially disadvantage same-sex couples
(especially those who engage in careful tax planning), and those that
do may be offset by Code features beneficial to them.
1. Limited Disadvantage
It is possible to overstate the significance of some of the asserted
advantages available to married couples. For example, the estate and
gift tax considerations mentioned above do not matter for the clear
majority of Americans, including (presumably) the majority of same-
sex partners.22
Moreover, if the transferor is subject to gift tax, the blow is
somewhat cushioned by the fact that the transferee's basis in the
property is increased to reflect gift tax paid.23 If the transferee later
sells that property, her higher basis may decrease taxable income on
the sale or produce a deductible loss.24 There also is a basis tie-in if
the transfer was by bequest or inheritance 5
Similarly, the § 1041 income tax exclusion will not always be
crucial. Exclusion is of little import if the transferor is in a low
bracket for the year, as is possible, for instance, if he is an
independent contractor in a cyclical business or if he has unusually
high deductions for the year. Indeed, taxability may even be
preferable if the transferor has otherwise expiring net operating loss
carrybacks.26
And, basis matters here, too. The concomitant of non-
recognition of gain on spousal transfers or divorce transfers of
appreciated property is substituted basis. The transferee takes as her
basis in the property the transferor's adjusted basis. As a result, the
22. Because of the annual exclusion under § 2503(b) and the unified credit under
§§ 2010 and 2505, fewer than three percent of decedents' estates will pay federal estate
tax and only a small percentage of taxpayers will pay federal gift tax. See I.R.C. §§ 2010,
2503(b), 2505 (West Supp. 1998); BORIS I. BrrrKER ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr
TAXATION 8 (7th ed. 1996). Fewer still will pay such taxes as a result of the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997, which raises the unified credit exemption-equivalent amount from
$600,000 to $1,000,000 over a period of 10 years and excludes an additional $300,000 of
closely held business interests from estate taxation. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-34, §§ 501-502, 111 Stat. 788, 845-52 (amending I.R.C. §§ 2001(c),
2010(c)-(d), 2032A(a), 2503(b), 2505(a), and 2631(c), and creating new I.R.C. § 2033A).
23. See I.R.C. § 1015(d) (1994).
24. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 165(a)-(c), 1001(a) (West Supp. 1998).
25. See id. § 1014(a).
26. See id. § 172.
27. See id. § 1041(b)(2). In contrast, if the transfer is treated as a taxable exchange,
the transferee's basis in the property should reflect the appreciation element. See I.R.C.
§ 1012 (1994).
1776 [Vol. 76
CRITICAL TAX THEORY
transferee typically will pay tax on the appreciation when she sells
the property. In part, therefore, tax saved by the transferor will be
paid by the transferee.-8
2. Planning Possibilities
In situations in which married status might be beneficial, it
sometimes is possible for same-sex couples to obtain similar benefits
as a result of effective tax planning. Indeed, the thrust of Chase's
article is to explore precisely such planning possibilities.29 Because of
transaction costs and efficacy limitations, such expedients cannot be a
complete answer. Nonetheless, their availability and partial
effectiveness do minimize tax disparities between same-sex and
different-sex couples.
3. Offsetting Advantages
Although tax provisions sometimes advantage married couples,
they sometimes disadvantage them. First, several Code sections bar
favorable tax results if related parties-including spouses-are
involved in a transaction.30 Cohabiting but unmarried persons-
including same-sex couples-are not subject to these sections, and so
they have greater flexibility to arrange transactions to produce
favorable tax results.
Second, some of the sections purportedly advantageous to
marrieds actually are double-edged. Section 1041(a), for instance,
prevents non-recognition of losses as well as of gains.31  As a
consequence, it sometimes is the married couple, not the same-sex
couple, that suffers a tax disadvantage because of the existence of
§ 1041.
Similarly, rate differences for married taxpayers and joint filing
28. For a variety of reasons, the offset is unlikely to be complete: (1) the transferee
sometimes will be in a lower bracket than the transferor; (2) the property may depreciate
before being sold; (3) the transferee may not sell the property at all-if she holds it until
death, the property's basis in the hands of her beneficiary will be stepped up to include
the appreciation element, see I.R.C. § 1014(a) (West Supp. 1998); and (4) even if the
transferee's recognized gain nominally equals the transferor's non-recognized gain, any
substantial interval between transfer and sale would produce a time-value-of-money
disparity.
29. Chase describes the varying levels of tax effectiveness of such strategies as
contractual arrangements, domestic partnerships, joint property ownership, adult
adoption, insurance, wills, and other arrangements. See Chase, supra note 9, at 373-400.
30. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267 (losses and other deductions), 318 (attribution rules),
453(e) (installment sale dispositions), 704(e) (partnership allocations), and 1366(e) (S
corporation allocations) (West Supp. 1998).
31. See id. § 1041(a).
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status often are disadvantages, not benefits. Depending on the
spouses' income levels, marriage may entail a "marriage penalty"-
the spouses pay more in income tax than they would have had they
stayed single-instead of a "marriage bonus." 32  Indeed, the tax
balance may tip against marriage. According to one study, for over
sixty percent of couples, marriage increases their federal income tax.3
Moreover, tax rates alone do not fully explain why marriage is
dangerous from a tax standpoint. Filing jointly makes each spouse
jointly and severally liable for any taxes, deficiencies, interest, and
penalties for the year.34 When the partners own assets separately or
when divorce has occurred or looms, this joint liability can create an
unpleasant surprise for one or the other of the spouses. 35 By not
being married for income tax purposes, lack of joint liability is a
surprise same-sex partners avoid-a considerable advantage.
32. See generally Richard B. Malamud, Allocation of the Joint Return Marriage
Penalty and Bonus, 15 VA. TAX REV. 489, 491-97 (1996) (providing an overview of the
marriage penalty and the marriage bonus); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the
Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983,
988-94 (1993) (discussing the negative effects of income tax on married couples);
Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 339-42 (1994)(describing the marriage penalty and the marriage bonus). For a critical race perspective
on the issue, see Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, in
TAXING AMERICA 45 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996).
33. See Daniel R. Feenberg & Harvey S. Rosen, Recent Developments in the Marriage
Tax, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 91, 99-100 (1995). Another study concluded that, of couples with
over $50,000 in adjusted gross income, 54% experienced a marriage penalty, but that at
lower income levels, more experienced a bonus than a penalty. See CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX ch. 3, tbl.5 (1997). Overall, it concluded, 42% of all couples suffered a
penalty, 51% enjoyed a bonus, and 6% were unaffected. See id.
34. See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (West Supp. 1998). Relief is afforded to so-called
"innocent spouses" by § 6013(e), but that relief is unreliable. See Richard C.E. Beck, The
Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability for Income Taxes Should Be
Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317, 348-69 (1990); Jerome Borison, Getting Equity from the
Tax Court in Innocent Spouse Cases, 72 TAX NOTES 1787 (1996).
The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act passed by the House in
November 1997 would amend the innocent spouse rules. See H.R. 2676, 105th Cong.§ 321 (1997). Some version of this measure was expected to be enacted in spring or
summer 1998. However, it is probable that the measure will fall short of solving all the
problems with innocent spouse relief.
35. Indeed, "[g]iven the questionable defenses available for relief from joint tax
return liability, practitioners should question the wisdom of filing a joint tax return at all."
Theodore M. David, Counseling Women with IRS Tax Problems, PRAC. TAX L., Winter
1995, at 33, 36.
The IRS restructuring bill passed by the House would require the IRS to "establish
procedures to clearly alert married taxpayers of their joint and several liabilities on all
appropriate publications and instructions." H.R. 2676 § 351. This is a recognition of the
peril joint filing may entail.
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Put the foregoing points together. I am not arguing that the
Code actually discriminates against married couples relative to
unmarried (including same-sex) couples. I am arguing that a welter
of provisions with diverse and uncertain effects are at play. A full
attempt to reach an on-balance conclusion would have to consider all
of these provisions and apply them in light of the actual facts of
same-sex partners' lives.
For example, ascertaining whether joint filing rates would
produce a net penalty or bonus for same-sex couples would require
considering how income levels and disparities aniong same-sex
partners compare to those of married persons. Ascertaining the tax
effects of provisions relating to property transfers would require
considering, among other things, how wealth is distributed between
same-sex partners relative to how wealth is distributed between
spouses. Additional relevant empirical questions could be raised.
Obtaining the data to make some of the relevant comparisons
might be difficult. Certainly, I have not conducted the research and
made the evaluations that would be necessary to draw reliable
conclusions. But-and this is the important point-neither have
those who have tried to make the critical sexual-orientation case, and
it is on them that the burden of persuasion lies.
For these reasons, I believe that scholars and advocates have not
yet convincingly demonstrated that, on net, the failure to recognize
same-sex couples as married hurts them by imposing substantially
higher federal income tax liabilities on them.
II. CRITICAL RACE STUDIES AS TO HOME OWNERSHIP
As part of a more general examination of the effect of
government policies in the area, Professor john a. powell has
considered how the tax benefits of home ownership have been
distributed among races and classes.36 He looked at the home
mortgage interest deduction, the long-term capital gains preference,
the § 121 one-time exclusion, the § 1034 non-recognition rule, the
§ 1014 rule adjusting basis to fair market value, the deduction for
state and local real estate taxes, and the Code's failure to tax the
imputed rental value of self-owned housing.37 Professor powell
36. See john a. powell, How Government Tax and Housing Policies Have Racially
Segregated America, in TAXING AMERICA, supra note 32, at 80.
37. See id. at 92-95. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat.
788 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.A.), affected these provisions. It reduced
the top capital gains rate, formerly 28%, generally to 20% (10% for taxpayers in the 15%
bracket). See id. § 311, 111 Stat. at 831-36. It also amended § 121 and repealed § 1034. In
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maintains that "because home ownership is highly correlated with
race, subsequent 'neutral' tax deductions benefiting home owners
have operated to the disproportionate benefit of whites, exacerbating
the disparity between black and white opportunity structures.""8
A work of wider scope is Professors Beverly I. Moran and
William Whitford's A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code.39
Moran and Whitford put their work in the following context:
One main thrust of critical race theory is a belief that racial
subordination is everywhere, a structural aspect of all parts
of American society. If this part of critical race theory has
merit, then every important American institution should
reflect racial subordination, even such a seemingly neutral
institution as the American tax system.40
Moran and Whitford do not claim that their work proves that, on
the whole, the Code is systematically biased in favor of whites over
blacks, although they think their work provides some evidence in that
direction.41 That evidence emerges, they believe, from four aspects of
the Code: (1) rules as to wealth transfers; (2) rules as to home
ownership (largely the same rules considered by powell); (3) certain
employee benefit rules; and (4) the marriage penalty.42
Because it is not feasible here to comprehensively review Moran
and Whitford's article, I will confine my discussion to the area
common to their article and powell's piece: Code features relating to
home ownership. As to that area, Moran and Whitford contend that,
while many blacks benefit from the home ownership tax rules,
"whites benefit even more."43
It is true that whites own proportionately more homes than do
their place, the Act created a new § 121 exclusion allowing tax-free sale of a home every
two years for up to $250,000 of gain ($500,000 for married couples). See id. § 312, 111
Stat. at 836-41. On balance, these changes should not appreciably reduce, and may
increase, the attractiveness of residences for tax purposes. Thus, the 1997 changes do not
moot the issues raised by powell.
38. powell, supra note 36, at 93.
39. Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue
Code, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 751.
40. Id at 751-52 (footnote omitted). This formulation raises the stakes. Should the
Code be found, after full review of all of its aspects, not to discriminate against blacks,
then "racial subordination is [not] everywhere, [not] a structural aspect of all parts of
American society." Id. Apparently, failure to make the case as to the Code would, at
least in Moran and Whitford's eyes, undermine "[o]ne main thrust of critical race theory."
Id. at 751.
41. See id. at 754-55.
42. See id. at 755.
43. Id. at780.
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blacks, that those homes are proportionately more valuable, and that
those homes appreciate more rapidly.' But the interesting and
important question involves cause: Why do whites own more housing
than blacks?
One reason, of course, is that whites have higher incomes. By
itself, however, such an explanation would not be critically exciting.
To the extent differential enjoyment of tax benefits is income-
dependent, the Code sections in question may be the result of social-
class preference, not race preference.
Moreover, on a net basis, the Code is not stacked against the less
affluent. The ramshackle Code contains something good for almost
everyone, and something bad for almost everyone. If the more
affluent (and disproportionately white) have more home ownership
tax benefits, they also are burdened by progressive rates under § 1;
limits on deductions as a percentage of adjusted gross income under,
among others, §§ 67, 170, and 213; income-triggered deduction phase-
outs under, among others, §§ 68 and 151(d)(3); and wealth transfer
taxes.45 If the less affluent (and disproportionately black) have less in
home ownership tax benefits, they do have an inflation-adjusted
standard deduction under § 63(c) and a substantial refundable earned
income credit under § 32.46 In so marbled a system, to say that one
set of Code rules (those related to home ownership) has disparate
class-based effect is not a powerful statement, especially since the
federal income tax is, on net, progressive. 47
Given the weakness of a class-based argument, Moran and
Whitford attempt to control for income levels48 and still find
disparate racial impact as a result of the home ownership tax sections.
44. See id. at 775-79 (citing studies). Also, as an incident of progressive rates,
deductions of all kinds are more valuable to high-income taxpayers than to lower-income
taxpayers, so deductions benefit whites as a whole more than blacks as a whole.
45. "[Fjederal estate and gift taxes historically have made a significant contribution
to the overall progressivity of the tax system." MICHAEL J. GRAETz & DEBORAH H.
SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLIcIES 43 (3d ed. 1995).
46. This credit was projected to be worth about $135 billion to beneficiaries over a
five-year period. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1997-2001, at 23 & n.6 (Comm. Print
1996).
47. See, e.g., Charles E. Scott & Robert K. Triest, The Relationship Between Federal
and State Individual Income Tax Progressivity, 46 NAT'L TAX J. 95, 99-104 (1993).
Professor Moran has acknowledged this argument against class-based race criticism of the
Code, although she stopped short of embracing it. See Beverly Moran, From Urinal to
Manicure: Challenges to the Scholarship of Tax and Gender, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 191,
196 (1996).
48. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 39, at 756-57,776-79.
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However, even this more sophisticated version of the argument is
unsatisfactory. It is shaky in terms of the third and fourth elements
of a persuasive case outlined above. That is, (1) this version does not
explain why changing the Code is the appropriate remedy, and (2)
the recommended solutions are of dubious benefit.
A. Appropriate Remedy
Moran and Whitford's article does not purport to explain why,
on an income-controlled basis, blacks own less housing and less
valuable housing than whites. However, in a roughly
contemporaneous article, Professor Moran locates the cause in the
"fact that the real estate markets have been historically closed to
blacks."4 9 Professor powell emphasizes government policies.50 His
discussion of taxes comprises only a minority of his entry in Taxing
America-the bulk of it considers the effect of non-tax government
policies on housing opportunities.51
If they are right, why is changing the Code the appropriate
response? If unequal housing opportunities for blacks and whites are
caused by private real estate market discrimination and/or by wrong-
headed or counterproductive government housing policies, the direct
response would be to strengthen and enforce anti-discrimination laws
and to alter or abolish unfair housing programs. The energies and
resources available for reform should be directed at the cause of the
problem, not diverted to a secondary arena.5
It may well be that the home ownership tax sections should be
changed. I disliked the Code sections powell complained of-and I
dislike them as revised by the 1997 legislation-because they create
market inefficiencies, discriminate among taxpayers based on
personal lifestyle choices, substantially depress revenues, and add to
the complexity of the Code. But these are non-critical concerns. The
49. Moran, supra note 47, at 196.
50. See generally powell, supra note 36 (focusing on the influence of government
policies, including finance and exclusionary zoning, on location of housing).
51. See id. at 92-95 (discussing taxation in only a short section entitled "Tax Benefits
of Home Ownership").
52. The following objection might be made to my position. If sufficient political force
cannot be mustered to attack racial subordination directly (such as by enacting tougher
housing discrimination laws), perhaps it would be better than nothing to attack it
indirectly (by appropriately managing ostensibly neutral tax rules that have racially
disparate impacts). But the very complaints of critical race scholars about the Code show
that such indirect attacks have been no more successful than direct attacks. This is hardly
surprising since the same Congress enacts both tax and non-tax statutes. If opponents of
subordination can marshal the political will and capital to change the tax laws, should they
not be able to do the same to change non-tax laws?
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critical tax cases advanced by powell and Moran and Whitford are
weakened by the failure to show that the appropriate remedy
involves altering the Code, rather than pursuing non-tax remedies.
B. Satisfactory Solution
In addition to describing the purported anti-black effects of the
Code, Moran and Whitford offer reforms that a hypothetical Black
Congress might enact.53 They make five suggestions as to the
combined areas of wealth and home ownership: (1) replace the home
mortgage interest deduction and the real property tax deduction with
a credit, with a phase-out based on income, (2) maintain the § 121
exclusion and the § 1034 nonrecognition rule, (3) eliminate the
realization requirement for publicly traded securities and
nonresidential real estate, (4) repeal the capital gains preference, and
(5) maintain the § 102 exclusion. 4
I have two concerns about these recommendations. One is
practical, relating to complexity. The other is conceptual, relating to
the internal coherence of the proposed package of solutions.
1. Complexity
As I argue in subpart HI-B, the Code's complexity has become
intolerable. Moran and Whitford's suggestion to repeal the
preference for long-term capital gains would be an important step
towards simplification. However, the other aspects of their proposed
package would be less salutary. They would retain tax benefits
reflecting mortgage interest and property taxes (although converting
them from deductions to a credit); they would maintain two
exclusions (§ 102 and former § 121); and they would maintain an
exception from the rule that realized gains are recognized (former
§ 1034). 55 These measures would perpetuate major causes of the
Code's complexity: the premise that the Code should be used for
subsidy purposes and the large number of structural devices
developed for these purposes.
I think Moran and Whitford make a mistake in ratifying the
foundations of a complex Code. They and others who believe the
allegedly discriminatory features of the Code reflect the prevalent
power distribution of society should prefer simplification to
continued complexity. Consciously or unconsciously held
53. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 39, at 779-83.
54. See id. at 781-83.
55. See iL
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dominance/subordination preferences are likely to operate more
effectively in obscurity than out in the open. A complex Code
creates such obscurity, masking and thus perpetuating harmful
provisions. 5 In this regard, Moran and Whitford's proposal would
foster an environment congenial to the very problems they seek to
solve.
2. Internal Conceptual Tension
Moran and Whitford's recommendations as to wealth and home
ownership reflect two different and not fully compatible approaches.
On the one hand, some of the proposals would limit tax breaks
because blacks do not use them much, especially compared to whites.
The proposal to repeal the realization requirement as to publicly
traded securities and nonresidential real property bottoms on the
observation that blacks own little of such assets. The proposal to
repeal the capital gains preference reflects the observation that
blacks have few capital assets except for homes (and homes can be
tax-advantaged through other means).58
On the other hand, other proposals by Moran and Whitford
would preserve tax breaks even though blacks do not use them much.
Retention of the § 102 income tax exclusion for gifts and inheritances
would, the authors hope, permit blacks in the future to amass wealth
and transmit it intergenerationally even though, as matters stand
now, "blacks receive few gifts or bequests that benefit from this
exclusion."5 9  Retention of former §§ 121 and 1034 is similarly
defended even though whites benefit more from these provisions
than do blacks. 6
Individually, both of these approaches are understandable, but
their combination is problematic. A tension exists in critical gender
studies between, on the one hand, trying to help women in the status
56. This is a familiar idea. The tax expenditures concept, developed in the 1960s, has
become a significant tool of tax policy. That concept is based on the perception that
subsidies buried in the Code are more likely to escape effective public and congressional
scrutiny than are subsidies that must pass through the appropriations process. See, e.g.,
Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L
TAXJ. 244,244(1969). But see Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at
Gucci Gulcic A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE
L.J. 1165, 1166 (1993) (arguing against the tax expenditure critique "insofar as it is
premised on the asserted expertise of direct expenditure institutions").
57. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 39, at 782.
58. See id. at 782-83.
59. Id. at 783.
60. See id. at 782.
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and roles in which they now find themselves and, on the other hand,
trying to transform that status and those roles. Feminists coming
from one of these perspectives sometimes advocate changes that
feminists coming from the other perspective oppose.
61
Moran and Whitford's proposals show a similar tension within
critical race studies. Their proposals to limit tax benefits little used
now by blacks emphasize the current realities of life for many blacks
(little investable surplus), while their proposal to retain the § 102
exclusion reflects a hope that that reality will change.
Combining these approaches results in a package that lacks
internal coherence. For example, from whence will come the wealth
Moran and Whitford hope someday will be transmitted
intergenerationally under the § 102 exclusion? Presumably, it would
not come entirely from housing or saved wages. Investments in
stocks, bonds, nonresidential real estate, and the like historically have
been major avenues of wealth building.6' Thus, the very hope that
prompts Moran and Whitford to urge retention of § 102 (to facilitate
wealth transmission) would seem also to counsel for retention of the
realization requirement and the capital gains preference (to facilitate
accumulation of the wealth to be transmitted). Moran and
Whitford's proposed solutions operate at cross-purposes.
IlI. NON-CRITICAL BENEFITS
The fact that critical scholars sometimes have failed to
persuasively indict the Code on their own terms does not mean their
work has been profitless. Politically and intellectually, our country is
now engaged in an important debate about fundamental tax reform,
focusing on revising the income tax or replacing it with some variety
of consumption-based tax. The main currents of that debate have
involved economics and traditional tax policy arguments. However,
the perspectives developed in critical tax work can help to shape the
debate in at least two ways, by emphasizing the need to proceed in a
systemic, not piecemeal, fashion and by reinforcing the importance of
61. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and
Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001,2002-33 (1996).
62. Eventually, this will be true for blacks as well as non-blacks. The August 4, 1997,
issue of Fortune has as its focus the generation of African-Americans who are gaining
power in the business world. See The New Black Power, FORTUNE, Aug. 4, 1997, at 46,
46. If that is so, with it will come bonus stock, mutual funds, and all the customary capital
asset trappings of success. The "Lifetime Planning Guide" of a magazine devoted to
minority entrepreneurship advises its readers: "By now, it's clear that for the long run,
stocks ... are the best vehicle around." Judith Aidoo, Money Matters for Generation X,
BLACK ENTERPRISE, Sept. 1997, at 123, 124.
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simplification as an objective of reform.
A. Systemic Approach
Ad hoe tax changes have long been the norm and, on net, have
been counterproductive. In the main, the tax enactments of recent
decades have been aggregations of piecemeal, often unrelated
provisions rather than sets of interrelated and well-coordinated
changes. This fragmented, disjointed approach has produced a Code
that is worse now than it was twenty years ago.63
However, a hallmark of the current tax reform debate is a
broader orientation. Critical tax scholarship buttresses this trend.
Many critical pieces, including pieces discussed in Parts I and II, are
thematic in character, looking at multiple Code sections producing
related effects rather than at individual sections in isolation. Such
work complements, and hopefully will further stimulate, what I see as
a strong and growing interest among non-critical writers in thematic
tax studies.64
Moreover, other critical works have gone even further. Instead
of restricting their analysis to the Code, they have looked to the
interactions between the tax law and related non-tax laws. As
examples, I point to powell's discussion of tax law and non-tax
housing policy, other critical work stressing the interrelation of Social
Security taxes and Social Security benefit structures,65 and several
studies exploring the relationship between the earned income tax
credit and non-Code social welfare expenditure programs.66
63. Two leading tax scholars use the same word, "monstrous," to describe what the
Code has become. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME
TAX 7 (1997) (describing the Code as "this monstrous statute"); Erwin N. Griswold, Is the
Tax Law Going to Seed?, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1, 11 (1994) ("[O]ur present tax system,
which worked very well during the first third of this century, and struggled along during
the second third of the century, has now come to the place where it is simply
monstrous."). Former IRS Commissioner Shirley Peterson opines: "'I would repeal the
Internal Revenue Code and start over.'" Rob Norton, Our Screwed-Up Tax Code,
FORTUNE, Sept. 6,1993, at 34,34 (quoting Shirley Peterson).
64. Such studies have included examination of tax rules affecting families, children,
and the elderly. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1389 (1975); Jonathan Barry Forman, Reconsidering the Income Tax
Treatment of the Elderly: It's Time for the Elderly to Pay Their Fair Share, 56 U. PiTr. L.
REV. 589 (1995); Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a
Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (1977); Gail Levin
Richmond, Taxes and the Elderly: An Introduction, 19 NOVA L. REV. 587 (1995);
Lawrence Zelenak, Children and the Income Tax, 49 TAX L. REV. 349 (1994).
65. See Moran, supra note 47, at 194; June O'Neill, Family Issues in Taxation, in
TAXING THE FAMILY 1, 15-19 (Rudolph G. Penner ed., 1983).
66. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of
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In these respects, critical tax studies-including some discussed
in Parts I and U-call us to a broad vision in tax reform, reinforcing
desirable trends in tax scholarship generally.
B. Simplification
I have long believed that meaningful simplification is the most
pressing need in tax reform. The Code is now so complex that it
cannot be effectively administered by the IRS;67 it imposes exorbitant
compliance costs; it spawns inequities since different taxpayers have
different abilities to understand and manipulate the rules; and it is
losing the popular and political support necessary to its effective
operation.6s
Although lip service often is paid to tax simplification, powerful
philosophical, behavioral, and political obstacles exist.69  One
problem is that constituencies seeking special (and complicating) tax
rules are well organized, while "there is no effective political
constituency for tax simplification."70  That being the case, it is
particularly incumbent on tax scholars and practitioners to keep the
spotlight fixed brightly on the necessity of real simplification."
Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995); Mary L. Heen, Welfare
Reform, Child Care Costs, and Taxes: Delivering Increased Work-Related Child Care
Benefits to Low-Income Families, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 173 (1995); Mary L. Heen,
Welfare Reform, the Child Care Dilemma, and the Tax Code, in TAXING AMERICA, supra
note 32, at 322.
67. See, e.g., Joseph Isenbergh, The End of Income Taxation, 45 TAX L. REV. 283,
314-15 (1990).
68. See GRAETZ, supra note 63, at 13-35. See generally Gregory A. Carnes &
Andrew D. Cuccia, An Analysis of the Effect of Tax Complexity and Its Perceived
Justification on Equity Judgments, J. AM. TAX ASS'N, Fall 1996, at 40, 54 ("Legislators
and tax commentators alike commonly argue that the tax law is overly complex. In fact,
the desire for simplification may be the one overriding goal on which supporters of all
current tax reform proposals agree.").
69. See, e.g., Edward 1. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS.
L. REV. 1267,1275-1318.
70. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 45, at 34.
71. Recent events underscore the magnitude of the challenge. In June 1997, the
Kerrey-Portman Commission issued its report. Among its conclusions, "[t]he
Commission found a clear connection between the complexity of the Internal Revenue
Code and the difficulty of tax law administration and taxpayer frustration. Compounding
the problem of administration is the frequency with which Congress and the President
change the tax law." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, A VISION FOR A NEw IRS § 6, at 35 (1997). Yet, two months later,
Congress changed the Code again, through an act containing 824 amendments to the
Code and nearly 300 new provisions. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
34, 111 Stat. 788 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.A.). The 1997 Act is a
catastrophe for those interested in Code simplification.
Five months thereafter, the House overwhelmingly passed a bill based on the
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Some critical work already has contributed to the cause of
simplification. An example involves the married-filing-jointly option
under I.R.C. § 6013(a). Abolition of that option has been urged in
various non-critical works.72 It also has become an objective for
many critical scholars,73 including Moran and Whitford. 4  As a
combined result, the intellectual case for abolition of the option is
overwhelming. In time, the political firmament will align with this
intellectual case and the option will be abolished, reducing the Code's
complexity.75
Many similar opportunities should be available. As I argued in
subpart II-B, critical scholars should have common cause with
traditional scholars with regard to simplification. For instance, as
seen in powell's work, part of the critical argument is at base a
structural criticism of deductions and exclusions. In a progressive-
rate system, those mechanisms benefit affluent taxpayers more than
Kerrey-Portman Commission's report. However, the bill contained only two of the
Commission's recommendations as to simplification, see H.R. 2676, 105th Cong. §§ 421-22
(1997), and it ignored important simplification recommendations, such as paring the IRS's
non-core functions, quadrennial simplification review, broadening the income tax base,
and eliminating the alternative minimum tax. The bill also included a provision
purportedly altering the burden of proof in civil tax litigation, see id. § 301, which was not
recommended by the Commission and which would produce more confusion and expense
for the government and taxpayers alike. See, e.g., Current and Quotable, 77 TAX NOTES
619-24 (1997); Tax Profs Urge Rejection of Burden-of-Proof Shift, 78 TAX NOTES 755-758
(1998) (letter from 97 tax law professors to members of the Senate Finance Committee).
71 See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 32, at 342; IRS Tax Correspondence, 72 TAX NOTES
422,422 (1996) (summarizing letter from Richard Beck to the IRS).
73. See, e.g., Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating
Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REv. 1, 32-69 (1980); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love,
Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 63, 107-11 (1993); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The
Partnership Model of Marriage in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1413,
1449-50 (1996); Toni Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at Tax
Time: Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8 VA. TAX REv. 773, 850-53 (1989); Laura
Ann Davis, Note, A Feminist Justification for the Adoption of an Individual Filing System,
62 S. CAL. L. REV. 197 (1988); cf. Lily Kahng, Fiction in Tax, in TAXING AMERICA, supra
note 32, at 25 (discussing the fiction of marital unity in the federal income and transfer
taxes).
As noted previously, critical sexual-preference advocates take a different tack,
seeking to extend the joint-filing option to same-sex couples. See supra text
accompanying notes 10-11. Because it is far from clear that this would benefit same-sex
couples financially, I suspect that such advocates are drawn by the symbolism of joint
filing. However, parity between different-sex couples and same-sex couples could be
achieved by abolishing joint filing for all, rather than extending it to all.
74. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 39, at 798-99.
75. Abolition of joint filing will eliminate the need for the detailed filing rules
contained in I.R.C. §§ 6013(a)-(d) and (f)-(h) and the complex and unsatisfactory
"innocent spouse" rules of § 6013(e), thus simplifying the Code.
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poorer taxpayers. 76 To the extent women, blacks, and others are
disproportionately in the second group, deductions and exclusions
are problematic for them.77 Serious simplification will require paring
many deductions and exclusions from the Code. Critical arguments
add another voice for that result.
76. But see Deborah M. Weiss, Tax Incentives Without Inequity, 41 UCLA L. REv.
1949, 1950-74, 1987 (1994) (suggesting that the tension between progressivity and
incentive provisions has been overstated and could be resolved by certain structural
changes).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47. Moran and Whitford's proposal to
replace the home mortgage interest deduction and the state real property tax deduction
with a credit reflects the same understanding. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 39, at
781; supra text accompanying note 44.
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